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Financial System* 
 
Leonid Grinin and Andrey Korotayev 
 
 
The present paper analyzes some aspects of the population ageing and its im-
portant consequences for particular societies and the whole world. Basing on this 
analysis, we can draw a conclusion that the future technological breakthrough is 
likely to take place in the 2030s (which we define as the final phase of the Cyber-
netic Revolution). In the 2020s – 2030s we will expect the upswing of the forthcom-
ing sixth Kondratieff wave, which will introduce the sixth technological paradigm 
(system). All those revolutionary technological changes will be connected, first of 
all, with breakthroughs in medicine and related technologies. We also present our 
ideas about the financial instruments that can help to solve the problem of pension 
provision for an increasing elderly population in the developed countries. We think 
that a more purposeful use of pension funds' assets together with an allocation 
(with necessary guarantees) of the latter into education and upgrading skills of 
young people in developing countries, perhaps, can partially solve the indicated 
problem in the developed states. 
Keywords: the sixth Kondratieff wave, the sixth technological paradigm, Cybernet-
ic Revolution, population ageing, world finance, pension funds, human capital, de-
veloped countries, developing countries. 
Human capital is one of the most important drivers of economic development whose con-
tribution to the growth of production and innovations is constantly increasing. According 
to the OECD definition, human capital is ‘the knowledge, skills, competencies and attrib-
utes embodied in individuals that facilitate the creation of personal, social and economic 
well-being’ (OECD 2001: 18; see also Kapelyushnikov 2012: 6–7). Human capital is central 
to debates about welfare, education, health care, and retirement. However, we think that the 
latter (i.e., retirement) is less frequently debated than it should be. Meanwhile, in the West 
the rapid population ageing actually devaluates the national human capital in every devel-
oped country. There are certain grounds to expect that if the ageing generation is not substi-
tuted by a more numerous generation of young specialists, the share of the elderly population 
will increase and the human capital is likely to decline. 
Thus, while the human capital as well as its contribution to the economic development 
is significantly larger in the developed countries than in the developing ones, the situation 
with demographic structure of human capital is different. The developing countries' situa-
tion is significantly better at this point, and this can increasingly contribute to the econom-
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ic competition between the First and Third worlds. We should also take into consideration 
the fact that the generation of highly educated pensioners in the developed states has in-
creased the demands on society and they play a more active political role than the genera-
tion of uneducated ‘old men’ in the developing countries. While the West has apparently 
depleted its demographic dividend, many developing countries, in fact, are only in the pro-
cess of its accumulation. And consequently, in this context they can get the most important 
advantage in the coming decades (see Fig. 1).  
This also confirms the idea of growing convergence between the developed and de-
veloping countries that we adhere to, as the current differences in the demographic struc-
ture and potentialities of the demographic dividend will contribute to the fact that at least 
in the next two decades the developing countries' growth rates will be on average higher 
than those of the developed countries, although this process can proceed with certain inter-
ruptions (see Grinin 2013а, 2013b, 2013c, 2014, 2015; Korotayev and Khaltourina 2009; 
Khaltourina and Korotayev 2010; Korotayev, Khaltourina, Malkov et al. 2010; Korotayev 
and Bozhevolnov 2010; Korotayev, Malkov et al. 2010; Malkov, Korotayev and Bozhevolnov 
2010; Malkov et al. 2010; Korotayev, Zinkina et al. 2011a; 2011b, 2012; Korotayev and 
de Munck 2013, 2014; Zinkina et al. 2014; Korotayev and Zinkina 2014; Korotayev, 
Goldstone, and Zinkina 2015; Grinin and Korotayev 2014a, 2014b, 2015а).  
 
Fig. 1. The dynamics of the working age population percentage in the total popula-
tion, 1950–2015, according to the UN medium forecast to 2100 
Source: UN Population Division 2015.  
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Problems of Population Ageing and Their Possible Solutions  
The population ageing (and an increasing number of disabled people) as well as the 
change in the population age structure (see Figs 2–5) alongside with forthcoming progress 
in medicine, innovation technologies, and increasing life expectancy in the developed 
countries will also bring great problems associated with a) the scarcity of labor resources; 
and b) problems of pension support for the older population.  
In some countries they are rather acute already today, but they are to become much 
more pressing. 
 
Fig. 2. Dynamics of the expected lifetime at birth (years) in the developed and  
developing countries, 1950–2015, the UN medium forecast to 2050  
Source: UN Population Division 2015.  
 
 
Fig. 3. Dynamics of the median age of population (years) in the developed and de-
veloping countries, 1950–2015, with the medium forecast of the UN till 
2030  
Source: UN Population Division 2015.  
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We would like to remind that if the median age of population of a given country equals, 
for example, 40 years, it means that half of the population of this country is younger than 
40 years, and the other one is older.  
 
Fig. 4. Increasing number of persons of retirement age (over 65), 1950–2015, with 
the UN medium forecast till 2050 
Source: UN Population Division 2015.  
As is shown above, a rapid global increase in the number of retirement-age persons is ex-
pected just in the next 20 years when their number will actually double within a small his-
torical period, thus it will increase almost by 600 million and the total number will consid-
erably exceed a billion. 
However, a rapid acceleration will be observed in particular as regards the population 
of people aged 80 years or more. While by 2050 the number of persons of retirement age 
will approximately double, the number of elderly people aged 80 years or more will prac-
tically quadruple, and in comparison with 1950 their number by 2075 will increase almost 
by 50 times (see Fig. 5).  
 
Fig. 5. Increase of global number of elderly people (aged 80 years), 1950–2015, 
with the UN average forecast till 2075  
Source: UN Population Division 2015.  
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The First World countries will face particular difficulties in the next 20–30 years due to  
a rapid increase in the number of retirement-age people accompanied with an accelerated 
reduction of the active working age population, and in 20 years the number of the former 
will exceed the number of the latter (see Fig. 6). 
 
Fig. 6. Dynamics of active working-age (25–49 years) population and number of 
persons of retirement age (aged over 60) in the more developed countries 
of the world,1 in millions, 2000–2015, with the medium forecast of the UN 
for the period till 2040 
Source: UN Population Division 2015.  
As one can notice, the number of older people per a working age adult will increase. This 
is very likely to lead to the decline in living standards and to the increasing tension be-
tween generations. 
One should keep in mind that the older population will form a major part of voters, 
thus making the politicians to follow their will. Besides, the highly educated generation of 
pensioners in the advanced countries has certain demanding social requirements and they 
are more politically active than the generation of uneducated old people in the developing 
states. The transition to such a sort of gerontocracy also poses many other threats to a so-
ciety and to its homogeneity because older people are more apt to conservatism and are 
less inclined to purchase expensive products, novelties and property, as well as to saving 
and this may reduce the focus on innovation and lead to considerable change of the con-
temporary economic model based on the expansion of consumerism. In particular, the 
population ageing in Japan is one of the reasons of the current deflationary trend (for more 
details see Grinin and Korotayev 2014c, 2015b). 
In theoretical terms, it is possible to distinguish the following possible solutions for 
the specified problems (here we suppose that all those solutions will be applied, whereas 
none of them can solve the problem comprehensively):  
1. To increase the number of immigrants in the developed countries. Still the opportu-
nities of this pattern are to a large extent depleted and besides, it leads to the erosion of the 
society's major ethno-cultural basis (today we face serious challenges in this direction). 
                                                          
1 More developed countries/regions according to the UN classification.  
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2. To raise the retirement age (together with active rehabilitation of the disabled peo-
ple). Against the background of the forthcoming revolution in medical and rehabilitating 
technologies this looks like an important (although insufficient) resource. 
3. The development of labor-saving technologies, in particular robot techniques for 
nursing, as well as elder and disabled people care (for more details see Grinin L. E. and 
Grinin A. L. 2015а, 2015b; Grinin A. L. and Grinin L. E. 2015b). This will allow a partial 
reduction of expenses for care and different services, but it can hardly bring a complete solu-
tion of the problem of scarce resources. 
4. Finally, the development of the financial system opens another path to the solution of 
problems with the pension system. The population ageing is directly related to the financial 
system not only within national systems, but within the global financial system as well. Due 
to the increasing number of retirees the pension savings have become not simply important, 
but essential to a certain extent. Besides, we should note that, on the one hand, today pension 
and other social funds are not isolated only within a framework of national system, but make 
an important component of the world finance in the long run. On the other hand, stable pen-
sion system substantially depends on the stable and efficient global financial system, even to 
a greater extent than on the national one.  
In the present article we will consider the second and the third directions in the solution 
of the problem of global population ageing which are closely interconnected, and then we 
will pass to consideration of the fourth (financial) one. 
Global Population Ageing and the Sixth Technological Paradigm  
The Cybernetic Revolution is a great breakthrough from industrial production to produc-
tion and services based on the operation of self-regulating systems. Its initial phase dates 
back to the 1950–1990s. The breakthroughs occurred in the spheres of automation, energy 
production, synthetic materials, space technologies, exploration of space and sea, agricul-
ture, and especially in the development of electronic control facilities, communication and 
information. We assume that the final phase will begin in the nearest decades, that is in the 
2030s or a bit later, and will last until the 2070s. 
We denote the initial phase of the Cybernetic Revolution as a scientific-information 
one, and the final – as a phase of self-regulating systems. So now we are in its moderniza-
tion phase which will probably last until the 2030s. This intermediate phase is a period of 
rapid diffusion and improvement of the innovations made at the previous phase (e.g., com-
puters, internet, cell phones, etc.). The technological and social conditions are also pre-
pared for the future breakthrough. We suppose that the final phase of the Cybernetic Revo-
lution will lead to the emergence of many various self-regulating systems (for more detail 
see Grinin 2006, 2009, 2012, 2013d; Grinin A. L. and Grinin L. E. 2013, 2015a, 2015c; 
Grinin L. E. and Grinin A. L. 2015a, 2015c).  
So we expect the beginning of the final phase of the Cybernetic Revolution in the 
2030s and 2040s. We assume that this technological breakthrough at first will be connect-
ed with a breakthrough in the field of new medical (and related to them) technologies. 
Thus, the increasing process of population ageing (as we will show further) will become 
one of the most important reasons of development of the final phase of Cybernetic Revolu-
tion. 
This phase, according to our forecasts, will be imposed on the sixth Kondratieff wave 
(which will probably last from the 2020s to the 2060s). Therefore, the sixth technological 
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paradigm (known also as technological system or style)2 will be connected with major trans-
formations of the Cybernetic Revolution. We consider the widespread ideas that the basis of 
the sixth technological paradigm will be formed by the NBIC technologies (or NBIC-
convergence), which are nano-bio-information and cognitive technologies (see Lynch 2004; 
Dator 2006; Pride and Korotayev 2008; Akaev 2010, 2011; see also Fukuyama 2002)3 to 
be only partially true. We believe that the basis of the sixth technological paradigm will be 
significantly wider. In general medicine, bio- and nanotechnologies, robotics, information 
and cognitive technologies will become the leading technological trends. They will create a 
complex system of self-regulated production. We could define this complex as MBNRIC-
technologies, by the first letters of the listed technological directions. Thus, it makes sense to 
speak about medicine as the central element of the new technological system (see also 
Nefiodow 1996; Nefiodow L. and Nefiodow S. 2014). Medicine more than any other field 
has unique opportunities for merging all these new technologies into a single system. Be-
sides, a number of demographic and economic reasons explain why this is precisely medi-
cine that should start the transition to the new technological paradigm. 
This will be supported by particularly advantageous situation developing by 2030 in 
economy, demography, culture, a standard of living, etc. that will define a huge need for sci-
entific and technological breakthrough. By advantageous situation, we do not mean that eve-
rything will be perfectly good in economy; just on the contrary, everything will be not as 
good as it could be. Advantageous conditions will be created because reserves and resources 
for continuation of previous trends will be exhausted, and at the same time the requirements 
of currently developed and developing societies will increase. Consequently, one will search 
for new developmental patterns. 
Let us describe the background. 
• By this time the problem of population ageing will show up to the full (for more de-
tail see the previous section). Moreover, this issue can turn simply fatal for democracies in 
developed countries (because the main electorate will be represented by elderly cohorts, 
and also the generation gap will increase [see also Fukuyama 2002]). In addition, the prob-
lem of population ageing will become more acute in a number of developing countries, for 
example, in China and even in India to a certain extent (about ageing in Asia see contribu-
tions of Park and Shin to this volume). 
• The pension payments will become an urgent problem (as the number of retirees per 
an employee will increase) and at the same time the scarcity of labor resources will in-
crease, which is already felt rather strongly in a number of countries including Russia (for 
more details see Grinin and Korotayev 2015c, 2010; Korotayev and Bozhevolnov 2012; 
Korotayev, Khaltourina, and Bozhevolnov 2011; Arkhangelsky et al. 2014; Korotayev et 
al. 2015). Thus, the problem of scarce labor and pension contributions will have to be 
solved in such a way that people physically could work for ten, fifteen and even more years 
(certainly here we can also face a number of social problems). This also implies the disabled 
people's adaptation for their fuller involvement into labor process due to new technical 
means and achievements in medicine (for more details see Grinin L. E. and Grinin A. L. 
2015b).4 
                                                          
2 Within this approach every Kondratieff wave is associated with a certain leading sector (or leading sectors), techno-
logical system or technological style (see Korotayev and Grinin 2012; Perez 2002, 2010). For example, the third 
Kondratieff wave is sometimes characterized as ‘the age of steel, electricity, and heavy engineering. The fourth wave 
takes in the age of oil, the automobile and mass production. Finally, the current fifth wave is described as the age of 
information and telecommunications’ (Papenhausen 2008: 789).  
3 There are also researchers (Jotterand 2008) who consider GRAIN (Genomics, Robotics, Artificial Intelligence, Nano-
technology) to be the leading set of the technological directions in the future. 
4 About the influence of ageing on growth rates see the papers of Goldstone and Park and Shin in this volume. 
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• Simultaneously, by this time, the birth rate in many developing countries will signifi-
cantly drop (for example, such developing countries as China, Iran, or Thailand already ex-
perience below-replacement fertility). Therefore, the respective governments will begin (and 
some of them have already started) worrying generally not about the problem of restriction 
of population growth, but about promotion of population growth and population health. 
• A huge volume of medical services in the world makes about 10 per cent of the GDP 
(and in a number of developed countries it makes more than 10 per cent, as, for example, 
in the USA – 17 per cent [calculated on the basis of World Bank 2015 data]). The popula-
tion ageing will make these volumes grow rather significantly.5 
• The development in the Third World countries leads to the growth of a vast stratum 
of middle class, while poverty and illiteracy are reduced. As a result, the emphasis of these 
countries' efforts will shift from the elimination of unbearable living conditions to im-
provement of the quality of life, health care, etc. Thus, large opportunities open up for the 
development of medicine which will get additional funds.  
So by the 2030s, the number of middle-aged and elderly people will increase; econo-
my will desperately need additional labor resources while the state will be interested in 
increasing the working ability of elderly people, whereas the population of wealthy and 
educated people will grow in a rather significant way. In other words, the unique condi-
tions for the stimulation of business, science and the state to make a breakthrough in the 
field of medicine will emerge, and just these unique conditions are necessary to start the 
innovative phase of revolution! 
It is extremely important to note that enormous financial resources will be accumulated 
for the technological breakthrough, such as: the pension money whose volume will increase at 
high rates; spending of governments on medical and social needs; growing expenses of the 
ageing population on supporting health, and also on health of growing world middle-class. All 
this can provide initial large investments, high investment appeal of respective venture projects 
and long-term high demand for innovative products, that is, a full set of favorable conditions 
for a powerful technological breakthrough will become available.  
In the context of population ageing problem we will consider some characteristics of the 
global financial system. 
The Crisis and the Characteristics of the Financial System  
The 2008 crisis and subsequent years aggravated both financial and economic, as well as 
some global social problems. One of the most important problems among them is the 
problem of secure social guarantees for rapid ageing population of the World System core. 
In each country the security of these guarantees is connected with stability of the world 
financial system. 
Let us recollect some important reasons of the global financial economic crisis:  
 Random and extremely rapid development of new financial centers and financial flows;  
 Non-transparency of many financial instruments, which led to the actual conceal-
ment of risks and their global underestimation; 
 An excessive level of public debt in many developed and developing countries 
combined with ineffective use of credits.  
They often also say that modern financial technologies are fundamentally deleterious 
and only bring the world economy into various troubles and that they are only beneficial to 
                                                          
5 Some studies find that health care costs of patients aged 75–84 years are almost twice as large as the costs of 65– 
74 years old patients; and the expenses on patients of the 85+ age group increase by more than three times in compar-
ison with the latter (Alemayehu and Warner 2004; Fuchs 1998). The cost of home care and short-term stay in the 
hospital also to a large degree depends on the patients' age (Liang et al. 1996).  
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the financiers and speculators. Thus, it would hardly be an exaggeration to maintain that 
the global crisis, as well as other events, has demonstrated, in an especially salient way, 
the necessity for major changes in the regulation of international economic activities and 
movements of world financial flows.  
Nevertheless, we believe that it is reasonable to speak not only about the negative role of 
the world financial flows. On the whole, new financial technologies decrease the risks in a 
rather effective way and expand opportunities to attract and accumulate enormous capitals, 
involve actors, and penetrate markets.  
The positive effects of the new financial technologies consist in the following: 
1. A powerful expansion of the range of financial instruments and products, which 
leads to the expanding opportunities to choose the most convenient financial instrument.  
2. The standardization of financial instruments and products provides a considerable 
time-saving for those who use financial instruments; it makes it possible to purchase fi-
nancial securities without a detailed analysis of particular stocks; this leads to an increase 
in the number of participants by an order of magnitude. 
3. The institutionalization of the ways to minimize individual risks. Some financial in-
novations and new regulations help to minimize both the individual risks of unfulfilled 
deals and also of bankruptcies in the framework of certain stock markets. 
4. The increase in the number of participants and centers for the trade of financial in-
struments. Modern financial instruments have made it possible to include a great number 
of people via various special programs, mediators, and structures.  
We also suppose that new financial technologies and modern financial sector have al-
so got such important positive functions as the ‘insurance’ of social guaranties at the glob-
al scale. The matter is that the rejection of the gold standard resulted in the movement of 
the function of the protection of savings from an ‘independent’ guarantor (i.e., precious 
metals) to the state. However, there was no state left for the capital owners to entirely rely 
on as on a perfectly secure guarantor. 
The absence of secure guarantees is especially important in terms of the ways to pre-
serve pension and other social funds.  
The sharp increase in the quantity of capitals, the necessity to preserve them from in-
flation and to find their profitable application objectively pushed the financial market ac-
tors to look for new forms of financial activities. Generally, the faster are the movements 
and transformations of financial objects, the better is the preservation of capitals.  
Another important point is the distribution of risks at the global scale. We observe grow-
ing opportunities to distribute risks among a larger number of participants and countries, to 
transform a relatively small number of initial financial objects into a very large number of 
financial products. This makes it possible to achieve the maximum diversification by allow-
ing people to choose convenient forms of financial products and to change them whenever 
necessary. 
The next point is the growth of financial specialization (including various forms of 
deposit insurance) that supports diversification and the possibilities for expansion.  
In 2010, there was one pensioner per four working-age adults, whereas in 2025, ac-
cording to the forecasts of the UN Population Division there will be less than three work-
ing-age adults per a pensioner in the developed countries, and there exist even more pes-
simistic forecasts (see Fig. 7). Who will fill the pension funds in the future? Who will ful-
fill the social obligations with respect to hundreds of millions of elderly voters?  
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Fig. 7. Dynamics of number of pensioners aged 65 and older, per 100 working age 
adults aged 25–64 years in developed countries, 1985–2050 with medium 
forecast of UN for the period till 2050 
Source: UN Population Division 2015.  
Here one should take into account that most pension funds are concentrated not in the state 
pension funds, but in thousands of private (non-state) pension funds (OECD 2014b) that 
rather actively search for the most secure and profitable investments. The amounts of 
money concentrated in pension and other funds are enormous: dozens trillion US dollars 
(see, e.g., Shtefan 2008; OECD 2014a; 2014b, 2015; see also Fig. 8).  
 
Fig. 8. Amounts of capital accumulated in the countries of OECD by 2013 by the 
main types of institutional investors (in trillions US Dollars)  
Source: OECD 2014b: 7.  
In 2012, the accumulations in pension funds of the OECD countries amounted 77.1 per cent 
of their GDP, but in 2013 this indicator grew to 84.2 per cent (OECD 2014b: 7).  
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Fig. 9. Assets under management of various types of funds 
Source: The Economist 2008.  
Meanwhile, in the developing countries we observe a huge number of young adults; and it 
is extremely difficult to provide all of them with jobs and education (see Fig. 10).  
  
Fig. 10. Young population (aged 15–24 years old) of more and less developed re-
gions, mlns, 1950–2015 
Source: UN Population Division 2015.  
It is difficult or even impossible to solve this task without active integration of the periph-
eral economies into the World System economy as well as without diffusion of capitals 
and technologies from the World System core; in its turn, such integration cannot be 
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achieved without the development of the world financial system. The situation favors this 
in some respects because the number of pensioners in the developing countries is still rela-
tively small, the social obligations with respect to them are relatively few, and only after a 
significant period of time the problem of the pensioners' support will become acute in 
those countries. 
Consequently, the point is to involve pension and other social funds in boosting the 
developing countries' economies more actively.6 It will assist the latter to provide jobs and 
education for the young people at present and will multiply the funds in the future. In this 
case under certain agreements between developed and developing countries it will be pos-
sible to achieve a situation when the rising economies will allocate some assets to support 
the growing layer of older people in the West, the latter will act as a rentier in this case 
(recently Joseph Stiglitz has expressed similar ideas [Stiglitz 2015]).  
Then, there will be no need in the direct migration of millions of young people from 
the Third World to the First one; thus, there could emerge a sort of solidarity between dif-
ferent generations of the global world. Of course, such a system will demand considerable 
measures with respect to security and reliability of such investments. But at the same time, 
it would provide a certain convergence of different countries' interests. 
Thus, we may say that: 
 The participation of pension and insurance funds in financial operations leads to the 
globalization of the social sphere.  
 The countries poor in capital, but with large cohorts of young population, are in-
volved more and more in a very important (though not quite apparent) process of support-
ing the elderly population in the West through the unification of the world financial sys-
tem, its standardization, and the search for the ways to make it more fair and socially ori-
ented. 
 Modern financial assets and flows became global and international; a considerable 
amount of money circulates within this system (though, of course, not all its participants 
make equal profits).  
 At the same time, one should realize that a considerable part of the circulating sums 
is the money from social funds (in particular from the pension ones) and their loss can lead 
to disasters with such consequences that are very difficult to predict.  
 Safe management of the global capital (in addition to its obvious economic and so-
cial merits) assures the safe future for the elderly and those who need social protection.  
 Therefore, the problem of institutional support of financial globalization becomes 
more and more important. 
Let us indicate some key points which clarify the opportunities and difficulties of 
the suggested scheme; besides, let us outline some of the most important institutional 
decisions which could help this scheme to function in practice. 
First. The pension monies play a certain role in the financial system and depend on 
well-being and normal functioning of the latter. Money from pension funds is still one of 
the major systemic components of national and world financial systems. Actually, this 
means that these are just pension funds that remain one of the leading traders buying gov-
ernment bonds, and also actively buying shares and other securities at stock markets. 
                                                          
6 It is worth noting that they already participate in this process. Thus, in the large private retirement funds surveyed in 
2014 by OECD staff, an average of 36.6 per cent of all capital were invested abroad (OECD 2014a: 15), whereas 
more than a half of the surveyed large pension funds invested a part of their capitals in developing economies (ОЕСD 
2014а: 13, 31, 43).  
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While the conservative investment policy of pension funds is quite reasonable in general, 
at the same time it makes them as well as many other subsystems of the financial system 
highly dependent on the manipulations of the Central Bank, rating agencies and other ac-
tors. Particularly, the income of pension funds has considerably decreased in recent years 
due to deflationary tendencies and low rates on the government debt securities (as the gov-
ernment pays low interests rates to pension funds on the most reliable debt bonds).  
Second. Mounting crisis phenomena in financial system are able to radically under-
mine the well-being of pension funds. The latter have actively invested in securities; there-
fore, the cost of their assets largely depends on the price of securities. On the one hand, the 
governmental authorities and exchange players wish to manipulate this cost and its artifi-
cial high price (e.g., the so-called buyback transaction of the securities by firms), and on 
the other hand, in case of crisis the assets' slump can be quite serious. For example, while 
in 2007 the asset value of US pension funds amounted to 78.0 per cent of the American 
GDP, during the crisis in 2008 it dropped to 59.6 per cent of GDP. The situation returned 
to pre-crisis level only in 2013 (OECD 2015: Funded Pensions Indicators: Occupational 
pension funds' assets as a per cent of GDP); in other words, pension contributions have 
become entirely dependent on the economic situation. Therefore, we need some mecha-
nisms of preserving accumulations, including the opportunity to lean on the world finan-
cial system. 
Third. As we have said earlier, today the secure preservation of the value of accumu-
lated funds depends on the speed of their circulation. However, finances do not exist by 
themselves, they can hardly break from the production base for a long time and has to rely 
on real production (the increasing separation of the financial system from production is 
one of the main problems of the current situation which is largely supported by the mone-
tary doctrine). Thus, we face the necessity of driving the finances (and pension money) be-
yond national borders. Especially at present, since the production is rather actively moved to 
the developing countries. Therefore, no wonder that many pension funds invest into emerg-
ing markets to increase their income (OECD 2014a: 15). Only few funds do not invest in 
foreign assets, while some, on the contrary, invest a large amount of their capital abroad 
(Ibid.). Certainly, the foreign investments do not always imply investments into develop-
ing countries. Nevertheless, some investments are made, and thus, the proposed scheme 
already functions in a certain way. But we can face several serious problems. First, this is 
most often ‘short’, in fact, speculative money, whereas generally these are long-term 
investments that can serve a real source of economic development and income. Second, 
this money is almost the first to leave the emerging markets because of their volatility 
(not least connected with the policy of FRS and ECB) and fully justified conservatism of 
pension funds; and this also increases the volatility. Third, the emerging markets certain-
ly offer less guarantees than the developed ones, and therefore, the cautiousness of the 
funds is fully justified. 
Fourth. For an effective functioning of the proposed scheme some high-level agree-
ments are necessary. Here various forms could be used, for example, investment of money 
of pension funds in the assets of such largest international financial institutions, as the 
IMF, WB, ADB, etc. These investments would be non-voting, but the money would be 
much securer there, and special obligations could guarantee that these funds would be al-
located to increase the level of education and qualification of young people in the develop-
ing countries. 
It would be quite reasonable to develop some global organizations for the sake of co-
operation between pension and other funds, as well as establishing common insurance 
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funds that will make it possible to support countries in case of a crisis. One could establish 
an International Pension Fund or something of the kind which would realize financial 
transfers so that the assets of the ‘older’ population of some countries could help to raise 
the economy in the countries with ‘young’ population and to accumulate funds for donor 
countries for the future. Some specific arrangements between countries with certain guar-
antees for safety of funds would seem rather appropriate. In brief, there could be many 
options. But the main problem is that despite the fast population ageing, the versions of 
global solution for the problem are poorly considered. 
The Russian philosopher, Alexander Zinoviev, deported to Germany in the 1970s, quite 
accurately described the Western society as a society of monetary totalitarianism (Zinoviev 
2003) where the mechanism, realizing and preserving it, had reached enormous scales and 
had become one of the most important pillars of the society. This mechanism had formed in 
the period of the gold standard and after its cancellation the scale of financial economy had 
grown tremendously, having spread all over the world. In fact, a new huge sector of financial 
services has emerged which in some countries amounts to 25–30 per cent of their GDP. But 
the importance of this sector will increase in almost all countries, and will also involve their 
most important social functions.  
Hence, the issue of the institutional support of the financial globalization becomes 
more and more important. We can speak about an extraordinary importance of the reliabil-
ity and controllability of this system. Its changes should include the increasing coordina-
tion between governments and unified international legislation which regulates financial 
activities and movements. Besides, one should take into account that today the developed 
countries generally get more benefits from this system and constantly use it to solve their 
national issues (thus, affecting the whole world) and also they willingly use it as a means 
to impact other countries' economies.   
We suppose that important guarantees for the future Western pensioners will consist 
in the development pattern of the global economy which should transform into a single 
organism. Thus, the global financial system would become strong but will be used neither 
to get the developing countries under control nor as a means to collapse the Third World 
countries' economies, nor as a means of unwarranted sanctions and suppression of socie-
ties and regimes which the West considers uneasy. There should occur some transfor-
mations in the global financial system that would take into account the growing econo-
mies' interests and thus allow the developing countries to more actively use the social 
funds accumulated by the West. And at the same time, this will prevent certain govern-
ments from expropriating the invested funds.   
Actually, the world needs a new system of financial-economic regulation at the global 
scale. 
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